Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.005zbMath1274.91076OpenAlexW2014804300MaRDI QIDQ380855

John Duffy, Jack Ochs

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000784?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesequilibrium selectionexperimentsspeculative attackssubgame perfectionglobal gamesentry gamescoordination problemsstrategic complementarities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Dynamic games (91A25) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games ⋮ Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures ⋮ The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: an experimental study ⋮ Coordination under limited depth of reasoning

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Dynamic coordination with individual learning
• Dynamic coordination games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• A Herding Perspective on Global Games and Multiplicity
• Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks
• The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

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