Incorporating unawareness into contract theory

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.009zbMath1274.91247OpenAlexW4255261106MaRDI QIDQ380866

Emel Filiz-Ozbay

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000826?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

insuranceasymmetric awareness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (20)

Incorporating unawareness into contract theory ⋮ Introspective unawareness and observable choice ⋮ Unawareness of theorems ⋮ Framing contingencies in contracts ⋮ Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness ⋮ Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior ⋮ Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard ⋮ Guessing the game: an individual's awareness and assessment of a game's existence ⋮ Multi-task agency with unawareness ⋮ Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers ⋮ Persuasion as a contest ⋮ A canonical model for interactive unawareness ⋮ Two models of unawareness: comparing the object-based and the subjective-state-space approaches ⋮ Unawareness without AU introspection ⋮ Syntactic foundations for unawareness of theorems ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ Games with unawareness ⋮ Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness ⋮ Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies ⋮ Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions

Cites Work

• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Interactive unawareness
• Information structures with unawareness
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Unawareness and bankruptcy: a general equilibrium model
• Awareness and partitional information structures
• Competitive equilibrium with unawareness in economies with production
• Extensive games with possibly unaware players
• Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
• Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Internal versus External Capital Markets

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