Political competition between differentiated candidates
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Publication:380876
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.003zbMath1274.91170OpenAlexW3122543462MaRDI QIDQ380876
Mattias K. Polborn, Stefan Krasa
Publication date: 14 November 2013
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2560.pdf
Related Items (11)
Divergent platforms ⋮ Endogenous party platforms: `stochastic' membership ⋮ Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets ⋮ Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates ⋮ Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with differentiated candidates ⋮ The binary policy model ⋮ Valence, complementarities, and political polarization ⋮ Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich-McKelvey scaling ⋮ Intensity valence ⋮ Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
Cites Work
- ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
- Private polling in elections and voter welfare
- The binary policy model
- Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
- A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
- Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters
- Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
- Political Motivations
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
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