Strategy-proof partitioning

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.004zbMath1274.91178OpenAlexW2030332234MaRDI QIDQ380879

Souvik Roy, Debasis Mishra

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000772?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

intermediate domainmeet social choice functionstrategy-proof partitioning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property

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