Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.05.006zbMath1274.91293OpenAlexW2137921101MaRDI QIDQ380882

Mohammad Hasan, H. S. Yoon

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-1108.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyasymmetric informationrational expectations equilibriumconditional independenceexact law of large numbersincentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (6)

Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization ⋮ A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity ⋮ Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ Perfect and proper equilibria in large games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Informational efficiency with ambiguous information
• Core and equilibria under ambiguity
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
• Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case
• Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
• Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information.
• Core convergence with asymmetric information
• On the core of an economy with differential information
• Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
• Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
• Generic Existence of Completely Revealing Equilibria for Economies with Uncertainty when Prices Convey Information
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders

This page was built for publication: Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium