Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.04.001zbMath1274.91057OpenAlexW2117607909MaRDI QIDQ380886

René van den Brink

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000590?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycooperative TU-gamecommunication graphcollusion neutralityhierarchical outcomenull player property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (9)

Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games ⋮ Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks ⋮ On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete ⋮ The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations ⋮ The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree ⋮ The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games ⋮ Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning ⋮ Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel ⋮ The average tree value for hypergraph games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Collusion properties of values
• Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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