Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.04.002zbMath1274.91218OpenAlexW1992797769WikidataQ110167436 ScholiaQ110167436MaRDI QIDQ380889

Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000607?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriumlegislative bargainingstatus quovon Neumann-Morgenstern stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Stable cores in information graph games

Cites Work

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• The dynamics of distributive politics
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
• Executive Control and Legislative Success
• Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?^*

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