To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.004zbMath1274.91087OpenAlexW2171514108MaRDI QIDQ380910

Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/41465164/wp11_11.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityimplementationmechanismsquantal response equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (8)

Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) coordination games ⋮ Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games ⋮ Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game ⋮ Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation ⋮ Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences

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