Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.004zbMath1274.91207OpenAlexW2051015527MaRDI QIDQ380944

Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612001364?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionstrategy-proofnesscollusionnetwork externalitiesrevenue maximizationuser group

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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