Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement

DOI10.2307/3440312zbMath0659.90009OpenAlexW1526504593MaRDI QIDQ3809538

David Besanko, David P. Baron

Publication date: 1988

Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3440312

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsmoral hazardprivate informationwelfare economicsimperfect monitoringOptimal contractsprocurement contractsagency-theoretic analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Optimal contracting of separable production technologies ⋮ Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection

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