Using Trembling-Hand Perfection to Alleviate the Interlinked Principal-Agent Problem

DOI10.2307/3440314zbMath0659.90022OpenAlexW1711450963MaRDI QIDQ3809548

Beth Allen

Publication date: 1988

Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3440314

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriamoral hazardmarket mechanismsimple interlinked principal-agent problemtrembling-hand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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