The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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Publication:3815875
DOI10.1287/moor.13.4.619zbMath0664.90075OpenAlexW2127529398MaRDI QIDQ3815875
No author found.
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e6a769ab83567767d2eb2f3fd0118ed9cc0aa02e
Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Individual preferences (91B08) Lattices (06B99)
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