Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model

DOI10.2307/2937856zbMath0667.90015OpenAlexW2049261861MaRDI QIDQ3820330

George J. Mailath

Publication date: 1989

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2937856

zbMATH Keywords

private informationseparating equilibriumsimultaneous signalingdifferentiated oligopolytwo-period linear model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (9)

Competition and confidentiality: signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information ⋮ An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria ⋮ Pervasive signaling ⋮ Signal-jamming in the frequency domain ⋮ Entry and espionage with noisy signals ⋮ Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination ⋮ There may be no pass through of a merger-related cost efficiency ⋮ Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information ⋮ Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket

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