A unifying impossibility theorem
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Publication:382333
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0750-6zbMath1284.91141OpenAlexW2089390008MaRDI QIDQ382333
Shino Takayama, Priscilla T. Y. Man
Publication date: 18 November 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0750-6
Related Items (10)
Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship ⋮ Bounded response of aggregated preferences ⋮ Joint misrepresentation with bribes ⋮ Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population ⋮ Impossibility theorems are modified and unified ⋮ Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ Superset-robust collective choice rules ⋮ The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population ⋮ A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
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