Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information

DOI10.2307/2297455zbMath0672.90029OpenAlexW1751143035MaRDI QIDQ3826320

Urs Schweizer

Publication date: 1989

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297455

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationsequential equilibriajurisdictionpolitical economicsefficient equilibriumeconomic analysis of lawgame of litigation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (6)

Signal jamming in pretrial negotiation with multiple defendants ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs ⋮ Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation ⋮ Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible ⋮ Equity bargaining with common value ⋮ Information-based trade

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