Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference

DOI10.1007/s11229-011-9997-2zbMath1275.03038OpenAlexW1996640292MaRDI QIDQ382990

David Makinson

Publication date: 25 November 2013

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/38778/1/Makinson_Logical-questions-behind-the-lottery-and-preface-paradoxes_2012.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

rationalityinconsistencyconjunctionlossy ruleslottery paradoxpreface paradoxuncertain inference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

Related Items (6)

Context-sensitivity and the preface paradox for credence ⋮ The logic of risky knowledge, reprised ⋮ Preferential semantics using non-smooth preference relations ⋮ Conditional probability in the light of qualitative belief change ⋮ Towards a Bayesian Theory of Second-Order Uncertainty: Lessons from Non-Standard Logics ⋮ Lossy Inference Rules and Their Bounds: A Brief Review

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