Regret and instability in causal decision theory

DOI10.1007/S11229-011-0022-6zbMath1275.91042OpenAlexW1992729557MaRDI QIDQ383019

James M. Joyce

Publication date: 25 November 2013

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0022-6

zbMATH Keywords

expected utilityreflection principleregretcausal decision theorydecision instabilitydynamics of deliberationratifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (10)

OBLIGATION, FREE CHOICE, AND THE LOGIC OF WEAKEST PERMISSIONS ⋮ A new problem with mixed decisions, or: you'll regret reading this article, but you still should ⋮ A Dutch book for CDT thirders ⋮ Ramsey and Joyce on deliberation and prediction ⋮ Metatickles and Death in Damascus ⋮ A NOTE ON THE EXISTENCE OF RATIFIABLE ACTS ⋮ The interference problem for the betting interpretation of degrees of belief ⋮ The faulty signal problem: counterfactual asymmetries in causal decision theory and rational deliberation ⋮ Lost memories and useless coins: revisiting the absentminded driver ⋮ Conditioning, intervening, and decision

Cites Work

• Are Newcomb problems really decisions?
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
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