Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general \(n\)-player games and its implications
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Publication:383317
DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2012.11.004zbMath1275.92079OpenAlexW2071896042WikidataQ51296380 ScholiaQ51296380MaRDI QIDQ383317
Publication date: 25 November 2013
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2012.11.004
evolutionary game theoryHamilton's rulefinite populations\(n\)-player gamesinclusive fitness theoryspite effect
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)
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