Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
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Publication:3839967
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00033zbMath0909.90121WikidataQ56658232 ScholiaQ56658232MaRDI QIDQ3839967
Publication date: 10 August 1998
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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