On the core of dynamic cooperative games

DOI10.1007/s13235-013-0078-7zbMath1281.91015arXiv1203.2832OpenAlexW3105079160MaRDI QIDQ384054

Marco Scarsini, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 25 November 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.2832

zbMATH Keywords

intertemporal coreMarkovian dynamic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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