The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
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Publication:384518
DOI10.1007/s11750-011-0191-yzbMath1282.91033OpenAlexW2152669793MaRDI QIDQ384518
Publication date: 28 November 2013
Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-011-0191-y
implementationweighted Shapley valueaxiomatizationcoalition structurecoalition-size weightscollective valuetwo-step Shapley value
Related Items (12)
A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure ⋮ The in-group egalitarian Owen values ⋮ Games with nested constraints given by a level structure ⋮ Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions ⋮ The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions ⋮ The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations ⋮ Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure
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- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
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