A tight characterization of strategic games with a unique equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2013.02.008zbMath1291.91010OpenAlexW2059032550MaRDI QIDQ385055

Antoniy Ganchev, Lata Narayanan, Sunil M. Shende

Publication date: 29 November 2013

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2013.02.008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Network protocols (68M12)

Cites Work

• Games to induce specified equilibria
• Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case
• Topological Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium for Selfish Routing with Atomic Users

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