Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust

DOI10.1007/s13235-012-0055-6zbMath1276.91026OpenAlexW2164094018MaRDI QIDQ385168

Michael L. Manapat, David G. Rand

Publication date: 29 November 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0055-6

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryevolutionary dynamicsreputationtrust game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Fairness and trust in structured populations ⋮ Coaction versus reciprocity in continuous-time models of cooperation ⋮ Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information

Cites Work

• Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma
• How to identify trust and reciprocity.
• Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Does Local Financial Development Matter?
• Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments

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