On Coalition Incentive Compatibility

DOI10.2307/2297048zbMath0419.90012OpenAlexW2109610577MaRDI QIDQ3853385

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry R. Green

Publication date: 1979

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16021/1/Laffont_16021.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionssocial choicegame theoretic modelmanipulationimpossibility theoremGroves mechanismsocial decision makingmisrepresentationspivotal mechanismseparable utility functioncoalition incentive compatibilitytruthful revelation of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies ⋮ On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties ⋮ Deriving consensus in multiagent systems ⋮ Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations ⋮ Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? ⋮ Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence ⋮ Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information ⋮ Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism ⋮ Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Manipulation through bribes ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation ⋮ Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers

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