Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria

DOI10.2307/1885999zbMath0422.90100OpenAlexW2081651982MaRDI QIDQ3856471

Thomas Marschak, Reinhard Selten

Publication date: 1978

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1885999

zbMATH Keywords

response functionoligopoly gamesnormal stateinertia supergameinfinitely repeated gameweak convolutionconservative combinationn- person noncooperative gameparaperfect combination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments ⋮ Quick responses in duopoly ensure monopoly pricing ⋮ Viscous demand. ⋮ Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames ⋮ The strength of a little perfection ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions ⋮ Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation ⋮ Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games

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