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Publication:3867502
zbMath0429.90009MaRDI QIDQ3867502
Publication date: 1979
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
monotonicity conditionsocial choiceexistence of a dictatornonimpositionconjectural equilibriadominent strategy equilibriaimplementable choice rulesnonnegative association
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