New equilibria for noncooperative two‐person games

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1980.9989896zbMath0429.90089OpenAlexW1973873347MaRDI QIDQ3867593

Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication date: 1980

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1980.9989896

zbMATH Keywords

generalized Nash equilibriasolution conceptsnoncooperative two-person gamesfinite repetitions of the prisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Social systems analysis

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The chain store paradox
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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