Game theory and power indices

DOI10.1007/BF01282508zbMath0433.90097MaRDI QIDQ3872244

Hannu Nurmi

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuebargaining setsvoting power indicesShapley-Shubik indexveto playerBanzhaf indexstable outcomesM-stabilitycomparison of indicescompetitive bargaining stabilitypresence of a vector

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

The inverse problem for power distributions in committees ⋮ Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes ⋮ Powers of subgroups in voting bodies ⋮ Staying power in sequential games ⋮ The burning coalition bargaining model ⋮ Strict proportional power in voting bodies

Cites Work

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• Generalised bargaining sets for cooperative games
• The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games
• Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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