Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
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Publication:387329
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.04.008zbMath1280.91080OpenAlexW2007459710MaRDI QIDQ387329
Publication date: 20 December 2013
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13289/
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (2)
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
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