Rational Behavior under Complete Ignorance
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Publication:3877334
DOI10.2307/1912184zbMath0436.90006OpenAlexW2074578067MaRDI QIDQ3877334
Jean-Yves Jaffray, Michèle Cohen
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912184
axiomatic approachrational behaviorcomplete ignorancecharacterization of criteriaindifference characteristicsinvariance of choicepersonal probability theories
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