Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy

DOI10.2307/1884470zbMath0436.90039OpenAlexW2137522380MaRDI QIDQ3877366

Thomas Römer, Howard Rosenthal

Publication date: 1979

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1884470

zbMATH Keywords

political economypublic expendituremonopoly modelreferendum votingresource allocation by voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Strategic voting in repeated referenda ⋮ Further implications of the reversion level in agenda-setter models ⋮ Reputational dynamics in spatial competition ⋮ On single-peaked domains and min-max rules ⋮ Leadership ability and agenda choice ⋮ EVALUATING THE SOCIAL OPTIMALITY OF DURABLE PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION USING THE HOUSING PRICE RESPONSE TO PUBLIC INVESTMENT ⋮ Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure ⋮ Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly ⋮ Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions ⋮ Incumbent reputations and ideological campaign contributions in spatial competition ⋮ Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players ⋮ Personal power dynamics in bargaining

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