Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3879007
DOI10.2307/1885661zbMath0437.90021OpenAlexW2127078558MaRDI QIDQ3879007
Publication date: 1980
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1885661
surveyefficiencyPareto optimalitydecentralizationvaluation functionscore statesdecentralizability resultspublic goods theoryvoluntary financing schemes
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items
The core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour ⋮ The pure theory of public goods: the case of many commodities ⋮ Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach ⋮ Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods ⋮ Core equivalence with congested public goods ⋮ Gale-Nikaido-Debreu and Milgrom-Shannon: communal interactions with endogenous community structures ⋮ Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods ⋮ Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach ⋮ Club theory and household formation ⋮ Competitive equilibria and robust efficiency with club goods ⋮ Two characterizations of cost share equilibria ⋮ Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition ⋮ Share equilibrium in local public good economies ⋮ Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects. ⋮ The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets ⋮ The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules ⋮ ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting ⋮ Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games ⋮ Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism ⋮ Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods ⋮ Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment ⋮ Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics ⋮ The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices ⋮ Coalitional economies with public projects ⋮ Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency ⋮ On the theory of cost sharing ⋮ OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS ⋮ Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy ⋮ Efficiency and nonlinear pricing in nonconvex environments with externalities: A generalization of the Lindahl equilibrium concept ⋮ Efficient egalitarian-equivalence and the core of an economy with public projects ⋮ Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies ⋮ THE CORE COINCIDES WITH THE NUCLEOLUS ALLOCATIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY WITH TAXATION ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization ⋮ Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs ⋮ Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons ⋮ Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
This page was built for publication: Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
