Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions

DOI10.1137/0139013zbMath0441.90006OpenAlexW2021061359MaRDI QIDQ3883837

Richard D. McKelvey, Peter Ungar, Peter C. Ordeshook

Publication date: 1980

Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20120719-094709222

zbMATH Keywords

necessary and sufficient conditionsvoting equilibriacontinuous voter distributionsexistence of majority rule equilibriameasurable cone

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (10)

Necessary gradient restrictions at the core of a voting rule ⋮ Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets ⋮ Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games ⋮ Condorcet meets Bentham ⋮ Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model ⋮ A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model ⋮ Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models ⋮ Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models ⋮ Relaxation of the Condorcet and Simpson conditions in voting location

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