On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
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Publication:3887167
DOI10.2307/1912822zbMath0443.90009OpenAlexW1968406976MaRDI QIDQ3887167
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912822
transferable utility environmentsPareto optimal outcomesdominant strategy mechanismnon-existence of mechanismsprivate goods allocationpublic goods allocationstrategy-proof choice mechanism
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