The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods

DOI10.2307/1912820zbMath0444.90019OpenAlexW2049285233MaRDI QIDQ3888800

John O. Ledyard, Theodore Groves

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/83407/

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsexistence of equilibriaLindahl equilibriumunknown preferencesmisrepresentationdetermination mechanismefficient public goods allocationsincentive compatible equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

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