Values and Derivatives

DOI10.1287/moor.5.4.523zbMath0448.90079OpenAlexW2104333503WikidataQ56157245 ScholiaQ56157245MaRDI QIDQ3895263

Jean-Francois Mertens

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.5.4.523

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuederivativesnonatomic gamesmarginal contributionvoting gamesexistence of valuesdiagonal formuladifferentiable gamesinfinitesimal player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (13)

Power and public goods ⋮ Values and cores of fuzzy games with infinitely many players ⋮ Cores of non-atomic market games ⋮ On non-atomic weighted majority games ⋮ The Shapley value in the non differentiable case ⋮ Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation ⋮ The limit-price mechanism. ⋮ Value on a class of non-differentiable market games ⋮ A characterization of exact non-atomic market games ⋮ The Burkill-Cesari integral on spaces of absolutely continuous games ⋮ Values of non-atomic vector measure games ⋮ The bargaining set of a large game ⋮ The core of large differentiable TU games

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