Incentives to cooperate in linear quadratic difference games

DOI10.1080/00207728008967040zbMath0448.90082OpenAlexW2078572436MaRDI QIDQ3895265

Joseph E. J. Plasmans, Aart J. De Zeeuw

Publication date: 1980

Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207728008967040

zbMATH Keywords

linear dynamicsRiccati type matrix equationsquadratic cost functionslinked macroeconometric policy modelsclosed-loop memoryless Nash equilibriumcooperative incentiveslinear quadratic difference gamesN-person nonzero-sum discrete-time dynamic gamessufficient Pareto optimality condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

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