Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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Publication:3896877
DOI10.2307/2321753zbMath0449.92024OpenAlexW4230379331WikidataQ56389713 ScholiaQ56389713MaRDI QIDQ3896877
Lester E. Dubins, David Freedman
Publication date: 1981
Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2321753
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