On Committee Decision Making: A Game Theoretical Approach

DOI10.1287/mnsc.26.4.387zbMath0451.90006OpenAlexW2155874937MaRDI QIDQ3898270

Prakash P. Shenoy

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1808/175

zbMATH Keywords

corevoting ruleCondorcet solutioncommittee gamescommittee decision makingAumann-Maschler bargaining setgame theoretical approachone- core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games ⋮ Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index ⋮ A theory of farsightedness in committee games ⋮ The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core

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