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Publication:3901249
zbMath0453.90007MaRDI QIDQ3901249
Publication date: 1979
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
implementationstrong Nash equilibriumsocial choice correspondenceimplementable SCCindividually rational SCCstrongly monotonic function
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