Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing

DOI10.2307/2296934zbMath0454.90008OpenAlexW2033647878MaRDI QIDQ3902783

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Publication date: 1980

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296934

zbMATH Keywords

existenceasymmetric informationlabor marketscompetitive marketswagesmarginal producttheory of testingapprenticeship programsgame of firmsmeasure of productivityNash equilibrium with free entrysorting mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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