Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information

DOI10.2307/1911926zbMath0454.90095OpenAlexW2072078689MaRDI QIDQ3902866

Takao Kobayashi

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5d7cf1e09188012d196fa30cb03840fe3c3c1350

zbMATH Keywords

differential informationcoreinformation exchangecommon knowledgedecision rulesyndicatesequilibrium contractsrisk sharing rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (14)

Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge ⋮ Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: The core ⋮ Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies ⋮ The core of an economy with differential information ⋮ Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information ⋮ Private information, transferable utility, and the core ⋮ On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information ⋮ Private value allocations in large economies with differential information ⋮ Market games with asymmetric information: the core ⋮ Pooling, pricing and trading of risks ⋮ Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core ⋮ Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information. ⋮ An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information ⋮ The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.

This page was built for publication: Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information