An Arbitration Model for Normal-Form Games

DOI10.1287/moor.1.1.82zbMath0457.90097OpenAlexW2159157446MaRDI QIDQ3907450

Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/121.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

normal-form gamesarbitration modelcooperative two-person normal-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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