On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control

DOI10.2307/2296917zbMath0459.90012OpenAlexW2082676781MaRDI QIDQ3910269

Peter J. Hammond, Partha Dasgupta, Eric S. Maskin

Publication date: 1980

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/64e5400f251ac58823907d0cd19e4328167497e3

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect informationoptimal pollution controltax policiesemission taxes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (15)

Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide ⋮ Environmental policy à la carte: letting firms choose their regulation ⋮ A complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution ⋮ Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains ⋮ Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures ⋮ An optional permit system for global pollution control ⋮ On optimal extraction under asymmetric information over reclamation costs ⋮ ON OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND ENFORCEMENT: INFORMATION, MONITORING AND EFFICIENCY ⋮ Network pollution games ⋮ Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty ⋮ On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs ⋮ Pollution control by options trading ⋮ AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ⋮ Environmental regulation in project-based industries

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