Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
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Publication:3911618
DOI10.2307/1912511zbMath0461.90007OpenAlexW2125899808WikidataQ56481598 ScholiaQ56481598MaRDI QIDQ3911618
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/58ac8cbc3ebce54c8827b0321ebe6c245a2b9380
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