Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
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Publication:3914794
DOI10.2307/1912747zbMath0463.90100OpenAlexW2165408566MaRDI QIDQ3914794
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ded5fc054e226ae5b56d253d6afcd982a9d2f4ca
sequential gamerepeated principal-agent relationshipepsilon equilibriumepsilon- optimal responsemonitoring cooperative agreementsone-period gameone-period Nash equilibriumPareto-optimal cooperative arrangementT-period game
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