Core Theory with Strongly Convex Preferences

DOI10.2307/1911411zbMath0464.90005OpenAlexW2179315586MaRDI QIDQ3916331

Robert M. Anderson

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d05/d0578.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

sequences of economiesuniform convexity condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (14)

STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS ⋮ The coalitional approach to core theory ⋮ Gap-minimizing prices and quadratic core convergence ⋮ A uniform core convergence result for non-convex economies ⋮ Market games and Walrasian equilibria ⋮ Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ A Nonstandard Approach to Option Pricing ⋮ Core convergence without monotone preferences and free disposal ⋮ On the effective content of asymptotic verifications of Edgeworth's Conjecture ⋮ Core allocations and small income transfers ⋮ Walrasian analysis via two-player games ⋮ On the independence of core-equivalence results from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ⋮ On a reformulation of Cournot-Nash equilibria ⋮ Walras degrees and probability of a blocking coalition at Pareto allocations

This page was built for publication: Core Theory with Strongly Convex Preferences