Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2013.07.034zbMath1358.91063OpenAlexW2051359248MaRDI QIDQ391782

Carmine Ventre

Publication date: 13 January 2014

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2013.07.034

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmsalgorithmic mechanism designmechanisms with verification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation ⋮ Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable ⋮ A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling ⋮ Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.

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