Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
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Publication:392663
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.05.005zbMath1282.91169OpenAlexW1980871419MaRDI QIDQ392663
Publication date: 15 January 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/80512
strategy-proofnesspopulation monotonicityallocation of an indivisible good and moneygroves mechanismsidentical-preferences lower-boundwelfare bounds
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)
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