Voting with Proportional Veto Power

DOI10.2307/1912535zbMath0474.90008OpenAlexW2093847821MaRDI QIDQ3929345

H. Moulin

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912535

zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriumveto powerimplementable social choice functionnecessary neutrality conditionsneutral social choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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